Abstract. Historical research on the American criminal justice system generally agrees that the "rehabilitative ideal"-the belief that punishment should reform offenders of their criminal ways-was an important factor shaping penal development in the twentieth century. While support for rehabilitation was never unanimous, particularly in Southern states where harsher modes of punishment historically prevailed, existing accounts conclude that the onset of mass incarceration was preceded by a universal repudiation of rehabilitation as a penal philosophy in the 1970s. This article complicates existing understandings of the rehabilitative ideal by examining its intellectual roots and tracing the role it played in political development. This reveals that the ideal's foundational premises rely on distinctions between curable offenders and incorrigible ones who cannot be reformed and must be contained, thus embedding a justification for punitive politics into rehabilitative penology. Early in the twentieth century, rehabilitative policy innovations like indeterminate sentencing were designed to have both curative and repressive functions, and political coalitions advancing punitive objectives like the eugenics movement drew on rehabilitative ideology in articulating their goals. In the 1970s, a tough-on-crime coalition facilitated the rise of the carceral state not by repudiating the ideal altogether, but by exploiting these premises to help further a punitive agenda. This should alarm contemporary reformers advancing rehabilitation as a possible panacea to mass incarceration, as the historical record indicates that the ideological structure of rehabilitative penology limits its potential as an alternative to punitive politics.
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Once primarily a source of academic interest, the phenomenon of mass incarceration in the United States has become a subject of political attention in recent years. Concerns over the cost of incarceration and its negative effects on offenders' lives have led policymakers to advocate various proposals to reduce the prison population. One commonly voiced proposition, particularly from the political Right, involves reorienting the penal system to focus on inmate rehabilitation to reduce crime and incarceration (Norquist 2016; "What Conservatives are Saying"; Shavin 2015) . Inmate rehabilitation is a worthwhile goal in its own right, but an historical analysis of rehabilitative penology reveals that a state commitment to rehabilitation is unlikely to reduce incarceration.
Scholars have offered various explanations for the carceral state's emergence, but many suggest that mass incarceration began in the 1970s after escalating retributive sentiments pushed policymakers to abandon the "rehabilitative ideal," an ideology dedicated to reforming offenders, in favor of punitive politics (Allen 1981; Garland 2001; Pratt 2007) .
Rehabilitative penology was never completely embraced, as punitive and racially biased forms of punishment persisted in many states throughout the twentieth century (Oshinsky 1996; Perkinson 2010; Muhammad 2010; Lynch 2010) . Nonetheless, many accounts conclude that the onset of mass incarceration was preceded by a wholesale repudiation of rehabilitation.
This article alternatively argues that a basis for punitive politics undergirded the rehabilitative ideal from its origins. Late nineteenth century penological scholars and practitioners imbued rehabilitation with a dual purpose, as failure to reform was deemed evidence that some offenders were incorrigible and must be incarcerated. An analysis indeterminate sentencing, the hallmark policy innovation of the rehabilitative ideal, reveals that indeterminate systems have consistently served both reformative and incapacitative purposes. My analysis of the early twentieth century eugenics movement further demonstrates how rehabilitative ideology can become a weapon for coalitions with coercive objectives. Ultimately, the tough-on-crime coalition of the 1970s facilitated a shift away from rehabilitation not by abandoning the ideal, but by exploiting its premises to justify a politics focused on containment. The revitalization of rehabilitative ideology today risks further exacerbating the punitive impulses of contemporary American politics.
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This analysis complicates orthodox understandings of penal rehabilitation and its role in American political development. It shows that rehabilitation has routinely resurfaced in debates about crime throughout the century and has limited the equality of those deemed incorrigible despite appearing ostensibly progressive. Several ideas about crime and human behavior that were foundational to the rehabilitative ideal continue to inform penal practice today as policymakers have repeatedly used the ideological structure of rehabilitation to further punitive agendas. By tracing the genealogy of contemporary crime politics to a rehabilitative ideology borne in the late nineteenth century, this article reveals that rehabilitation has consistently contributed to punitive policy developments, including the emergence of mass incarceration. This sheds new light on the punitive turn of the 1970s and indicates that the ideological structure of rehabilitation limits its potential as an alternative to punitive politics.
The Rehabilitative Ideal
In 1870, the American Congress of Corrections published its "Declaration of Principles" following its first annual meeting in Cincinnati. The Declaration encouraged the use of rehabilitative techniques in prisons and is widely understood to mark the moment at which prisons began to focus on inmate reform. Zebulon Brockway, a primary contributor to the Declaration's text and the first warden of New York's Elmira Reformatory when it opened in 1876, was one of the first penologists to implement the Congress's recommendations. Brockway's efforts at Elmira earned him the title "father of the rehabilitative ideal," and he was particularly praised for Elmira's indeterminate sentencing program that permitted early release for offenders based on their rehabilitative progress. By the end of the nineteenth century, Brockway's "rehabilitative ideal" had Grasso 4 largely supplanted alternative philosophies of punishment such as deterrence-based utilitarianism, while older religious reform techniques and prison labor systems were incorporated into Brockway's rehabilitative program (Conrad 1983; Pisciotta 1994; Rafter 1997; McLennan 2008) .
Despite this nominally progressive philosophy, Alexander Pisciotta (1994) has shown that Elmira's staff physically and psychologically abused inmates as they sought to instill Protestant ethic into prisoners while assimilating them into the working class.
Brockway's understanding of criminality provides insight into how Elmira could abuse inmates while being considered a model rehabilitative institution. Brockway saw degeneracy as a biological cause of crime, but believed that acquired traits-particularly impaired mental and moral faculties as a result of upbringing-were heritable (Brockway 1871, p. 39; 1872, p. 615; 1899, pp. 73-78) . This Lamarckian conception of heredity led Brockway to conclude that in many cases, criminality was an inherited acquired trait that could be rehabilitated. However, he also endorsed Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso's theory of criminal atavism. Lombrosian theory contended that certain physiological stigmata such as thick skulls or long ears were suggestive of a primitive biological inheritance that rendered individuals "born criminals" whose criminality could be attributed to immutable congenital defects (Lombroso 2006) .
1 Brockway discussed the "inferiority" of inmates with specific physiological traits and suggested that many were "defective fellow beings" with uncontrollable "animal instincts" (Brockway 1872, p. 613; 1899, p. 96; 1912, pp. 214-222 ). Brockway's acceptance of Lamarckian and Lombrosian theory allowed him to espouse a faith that some criminals could be rehabilitated while interpreting failure to reform as proof of an inclination towards criminality and "irresponsive[ness] to common restraints" (Brockway 1886; 1899, p. 80) . He argued that indeterminate sentences incentivized corrigible prisoners to reform while permitting incorrigibles to be "continuously held under enough of custodial restraint to protect the public." Between reforming the curable and containing the incurable, Brockway concluded that indeterminate sentencing would facilitate the creation of "a perfect race" (Brockway 1871, p. 42; 1874; 1904; 1912, p. 265) .
That the "father of the rehabilitative ideal" supported long-term containment is worth noticing not only as a doctrinal oddity, but also because his ideological duality conditioned developments in criminology. The works of these scholars were also influenced eugenical discourse emerging out of Francis Galton's work at the end of the nineteenth century, which argued that the human race should control its evolution by regulating breeding. These penologists often proposed eugenical solutions like sterilization or extermination for incorrigibles and rehabilitation for curable criminals.
Supporting rehabilitation first and foremost meant endorsing indeterminate sentencing. This was consistent across these authors' works, as determinate sentencing was universally condemned for failing to offer offenders incentives to reform (MacDonald 1893, p. 271; Boies 1893, pp. 189-90; Henderson 1893, pp. 288-293; Drahms 1900, pp. 365-70; McKim 1900, pp. 20-26; Lydston 1906, p. 605; Parsons 1909, pp. 177-81 (Proceedings 1908, 135-152; Proceedings 1911, 43-46) , and Arthur MacDonald told Columbia University students in surroundings" and that born criminals "cannot be helped" and must be contained ("Indeterminate Sentences" 1901, 11 (Parsons 1909, pp. 65, 148-9; Lydston 1906, pp. 606-11; Boies 1893, pp. 189-200; Boies 1901, pp. 311-31; McKim 1900, p. 146, 188-93; Henderson 1893, pp. 286-8; MacDonald 1893, pp. 269-70) .
In the forty years following Elmira's opening, seventeen reformatories were built across the country emulating, to greater or lesser degrees, Brockway's model (Pisciotta 1994, pp. 81-126) . By accepting the existence of born criminals, rehabilitative penology put the onus for reform exclusively on individuals and disregarded the social and economic structures that contribute to criminal behavior, absolving the state of any duty to reform incorrigibles. Many instruments of penology that are often taken for granted as progressive, like early release incentives, were tools created by Brockway and his protégés to further this project of sorting offenders into naturalized categories of corrigibility.
Borrowing from the field of American Political Development, this article conceptualizes political actors as operating within an inherited context of established ideational constructs that serve as constitutive elements for coalitional development and institutional change (Smith 2014) . Twentieth century policymakers have repeatedly justified punitive politics by appropriating from a constellation of ideas about criminality
Grasso 9 shaped by rehabilitative ideology. Pisciotta (1994) and Rafter (1997) have demonstrated how some of these ideas directed the development of reformatory institutions at the turn of the century, and this article extends this analysis by evaluating rehabilitative penology's role in shaping Progressive Era sentencing and eugenical laws as well as its role in the punitive politics of the latter twentieth century.
Rehabilitative Penology in the Progressive Era
Despite their reformist impulses, Progressives of the early twentieth century often coupled enlightened policy with a politics founded on Social Darwinism and pseudoscience that isolated mental defectives, racial minorities, and undesirables from "worthy"
elements of the population. The dual logic of rehabilitation provided ammunition for policymakers to target criminals as unworthy inferiors through sentencing and eugenical reforms. Despite being the cornerstone rehabilitative penology, indeterminate sentencing systems were designed with an eye towards containment, while eugenicists utilized rehabilitative penology to justify their politics. Together, these examples highlight four facets of rehabilitative ideology that justified punitive politics-(1) many criminals were incorrigible; (2) incorrigibility was largely biological; (3) offenders were personally responsible for their behavior and capacity for reformation; and (4) coercive state institutions were capable of enacting positive social change.
A few qualifications should be noted. First, the relevance of biology cannot be rejected in whole, as physiological disorders can produce behavior manifesting as crime.
However, this account notes that bio-determinist criminology has historically targeted minor offenders and marginalized members of society in abusive ways. Second, eugenicists couched their discourse in deterministic frameworks that would have likely secured the same reforms without the rehabilitative ideal. But they employed the rehabilitative ideal in justifying their objectives, demonstrating how rehabilitative ideology is ripe for weaponization by punitive coalitions championing exclusionary politics. Last, this analysis recognizes the breadth of early twentieth century race science as an academic discipline identifying scores of races, which downplays the black-white racial dynamic. While this article periodically considers how rehabilitative ideology interacted with ideas about black criminality, differentiating between the influences of racial and rehabilitative ideologies on punishment merits independent analysis. After New York's success, Ohio passed an indeterminate sentencing law in 1885.
Sentencing. Following Elmira
The law granted judges the discretion to sentence third time felons or petty thieves who had "failed to reform" to life imprisonment. Their 1890 report provided the legislature with correspondence from Brockway providing advice on how to structure the system.
Later reports praised the state for operating on "substantially the same plan as that of implementing requests of the SBC that the indeterminate sentence "be relieved of its maximum limit" so as to contain incorrigibles permanently (New York SBC 1907, p. 647; 1905, pp. 795, 798, 804 (1927, pp. 10, 13) .
While the Baumes Laws were symptomatic of a shift towards managerialism, they replicated statutes based on rehabilitative theory and concerns about incorrigibility remained a central political justification for them. This indicates that the policy innovations and ideological assumptions of rehabilitation had some staying power even as alternative penologies gained influence. Over the next two decades, forty-three states passed legislation based on the Baumes Laws (Tappan 1949; "Court Treatment" 1948) .
By 1970, all state and federal jurisdictions had indeterminate sentencing systems (Reitz 2011, p. 473) . It was not until the 1960s that rehabilitation explicitly returned to political discourse, but the indeterminate sentence and the ideas attached to it shaped development Grasso 13
during mid-century even as other penologies emerged.
Eugenics and Race Science. Race science and eugenics were distinct, but interdependent, schools of thought in the early twentieth century. Scientific racism was an intellectual endeavor seeking to hierarchically organize human racial categories with roots at least to the eighteenth century, while the eugenics movement emerged late in the nineteenth century with the aim of improving humanity through selective breeding. Sharp claimed that candidates for sterilization could be identified by the physical markings noted by Lombroso (Sharp 1909a; 1909b) . In the twentieth century, additional medical professionals became vocal advocates for sterilization laws (Cohen 2016, pp. 37-76) . Doctors and scholars often cited rehabilitative penologists to defend the procedure. necessitated inmate sterilization (1913, pp. 83-92, 261, 266 (Laughlin 1922, pp. 158-159) .
Support for eugenics was not limited to medical circles. Michael Willrich (1998) has traced the advent of "eugenics jurisprudence" in the early twentieth century, defined as "the aggressive mobilization of law and legal institutions in pursuit of eugenic goals" Olson stated that crime control should be "the first step in the eugenics programme" (Willrich 1998, pp. 85, 89) .
Eugenic practitioners thus drew on rehabilitative penology in different ways, as some defended sterilization as punishment while others saw it as curative. As Laughlin noted in his typology of sterilization laws, some state laws reflected "therapeutic" logic (California called it "beneficial and conducive" to the inmate) while others were punitive (Washington called the procedure "an addition to punishment") (Laughlin 1922 There is reason to believe that sterilizations were less common in prisons than in mental facilities, especially since some states only targeted the mentally ill and disabled (Hunter 1916) . But as Rafter (1997) has shown, early twentieth century research published by scholars like H.H. Goddard (1914) blurred distinctions between mental illness, low intelligence, and criminality by treating the mentally ill as "criminal types"
and by suggesting that "born criminals" were a variety of "feeble-mindedness." Further, courts with laboratories like Chicago's routinely sent defendants to institutes for the mentally ill and feeble-minded. This all suggests that the occupants of mental institutions where sterilizations were most common probably included many "criminal types." While not all were convicted criminals, at least 70,000 people were subjected to compulsory sterilizations between 1900 and 1970, although this is probably an underestimate given the likelihood that procedures occurred off the record.
Southern states were slower to endorse eugenics than Northern states. This is partially because eugenicists initially focused on purifying white genetics and segregating blacks out of the gene pool until eugenics was connected to blackness in the 1910s (Cohen 2016, pp. 58, 71-76) . Further, justified by the fusion of race science and criminological research, unique forms of punishment reserved for blacks like convict leasing and lynching tended to characterize Southern criminal justice (Oshinsky 1996; Muhammad 2010; Garland 2010) . These practices were built on notions of black incorrigibility inherent to long-standing ascriptive racial ideologies. However, the resemblance these ideas shared with the idea of incorrigibility embedded in rehabilitative logic indicates that the rehabilitative ideal was never a true alternative to Southern racialized justice. The "incorrigible" category has historically been populated with different groups, including recidivists, paupers, and "mental defectives," and would have likely included blacks in the South. This complicates the commonly held conclusion that 1981, indicating that relics of the eugenics movement and the conceptual overlap between mental illness, disability, and criminality had surprising durability before subsiding (Cohen 2016, p. 319) . But this article does not argue that eugenical ideology has been a constant fixture of twentieth century American political development. Rather, this case highlights how deterministic conceptions of criminality attached to rehabilitative ideology can reinforce the objectives of punitive coalitions. As the final section of the paper argues, this offers insight into the dangers posed by the revival of bio-criminology and rehabilitative ideology today.
Rehabilitation, Sentencing Reform, and Mass Incarceration
Rehabilitation Two years later, Robert Martinson (1974) published a paper concluding that prisons used few rehabilitative techniques successfully. His work was famously interpreted as saying nothing works, permitting conservatives to seize the empirical high ground in dismissing rehabilitation (Ruth and Reitz 2003, pp. 83-4 In the 1970s, the Right used the perceived failure of the Civil Rights Movement and War on Poverty to reduce crime to depict crime as a personal choice (Flamm 2005) .
In this context, Wilson's work resonated with politicians and the public by attributing inequality to personal failures and permitting people to distance themselves from the social and economic problems plaguing disadvantaged communities (Ruth and Reitz 2003, p. 88) . Leftist intellectuals also began to reject rehabilitation, with Francis Allen (1981) and Andrew von Hirsch (1976) concluding that it invaded inmates' rights and Marvin Frankel (1973) and Charles Silberman (1978) conceding to social science evidence damning rehabilitation. Ted Kennedy also pushed for determinate sentencing out of concern that indeterminacy generated arbitrary sentencing disparities. This broad alliance made being anti-rehabilitation the only viable political position.
The emergence of mandatory sentencing followed after indeterminate schemes were discredited. The Federal Sentencing Act of 1984 authorized the newly created
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United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) to produce more determinate sentencing guidelines that ultimately were, as Michael Tonry (1996, p. 89) noted, "oriented more toward toughness than toward fairness" given how dramatically they increased sentences.
Numerous states constructed similar systems cutting parole, implementing determinate guidelines, and increasing prison terms. A theoretically pure determinate system does not exist, as all variations permit some early release opportunities, but these mechanisms were radically constrained (Reitz 2011, pp. 474-5) . This represented a denunciation of the core policy of rehabilitation.
In a 1983 report about the Sentencing Reform Act, the Senate Judiciary Committee wrote, "imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation" (Senate Report 98-223, p. 73). Shortly before the law's passage, the House Judiciary Committee similarly specified that, "The bill prohibits the use of rehabilitation as a rationale for imprisonment" (House Report 98-1017, pp. 28, 40).
However, the Senate Committee also clarified that it "does not suggest that efforts to rehabilitate prisoners should be abandoned" (Senate Report 98-223, p. 73) while the House Report stated that rehabilitation remained "a permissible reason for imposing a sentence" (House Report 98-1017, p. 40) . This logic recognized value in pursuing rehabilitation in sentencing, but opposed incarceration as a rehabilitative tool. Thus, when the Act charged the USSC with promulgating sentencing guidelines, Congress left some room for the Commission to consider rehabilitative ideology.
First published in 1987, the guidelines constructed a matrix primarily considering offense seriousness and an offender's criminal history in specifying a narrow range in which federal judges could sentence offenders. The first page of the 1987 guidelines
Grasso 22 manual explicitly stated four purposes of punishment: "deterring crime, incapacitating the offender, providing just punishment, and rehabilitating the offender" (USSC 1987, p.
1.1). Confinement in substance abuse centers, mental health institutions, and similar facilities as conditions of probation or supervised release were authorized as sentencing options serving rehabilitative goals (1987, pp. 5.8-9, 5.23) . Rehabilitation thus remained a permissible consideration for judges in constructing non-carceral sentences, although these options were limited to few cases.
However, the logical reciprocal to rehabilitation-the predictive incapacitation of incorrigibles-also influenced the new sentencing regime. Defending the use of criminal history as a factor that could increase a defendant's sentence, the Commission claimed that, "To protect the public…the likelihood of recidivism and future criminal behavior must be considered. Repeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited likelihood of successful rehabilitation" (1987, p. 4.1 ). An offender's criminal history score was calculated not only by number and type of past convictions, but also included "diversionary dispositions" defendants received in state courts. Through diversionary dispositions, states authorized judges to grant non-carceral punishments for rehabilitative purposes in lieu of a finding of guilt (Shapiro 2008) . By incorporating diversionary dispositions into an offender's criminal history score, the Commission stated that it ensured "that defendants who receive the benefit of a rehabilitative sentence and continue to commit crimes [would] not be treated with further leniency" (1987, p. 4.8) .
The USSC suggested that considering criminal history was consonant with just deserts and utilitarian goals in addition to rehabilitative ones (1987, p. 4.1), but this rests on dubious reasoning. Just-deserts scholars often acknowledged that a penology focused on rectifying moral imbalances generated by specific acts left little logical room for lengthening an offender's sentence based on past behavior (Von Hirsch 1976, pp. 85-88; Morris 1974, pp. 79-80) . From a utilitarian perspective, Wilson found enhancing sentences for recidivists irrational given that recidivists are generally not deterrable, and also cautioned that sentences could be unjustly extended for previous minor offenses (1983, pp. 140-158) . Echoing Beccaria, Wilson stated that, "severity is the enemy of certainty and speed" (1983, p. 135) . 6 Predictive containment based on past behavior is difficult to fit within retributivist and deterrence frames, but was designed as a corollary to rehabilitation by using recidivism to identify incorrigibles.
Rehabilitation and indeterminate sentencing was discredited by a set of political and intellectual strategies. The shift to determinate sentencing was significant, but embodies some ideological continuity with indeterminacy. Constraints on judicial discretion and early release opportunities reflect a recalculation in estimates of incorrigibility, as determinate reforms were fueled by anxieties that judges routinely underestimated criminal incorrigibility. This was a crucial achievement of the punitive coalition-not dismissing rehabilitation, but reframing ideas central to rehabilitative ideology to stoke fears that criminals were unreformable. This coalition exploited the repressive facets of the rehabilitative ideal to legitimate their punitive politics.
Neoliberalism and Bio-Criminality
After incarceration, many offenders return to structurally disadvantaged communities with limited opportunities for social and economic mobility. Given that rehabilitative ideology disregards such structural factors that contribute to crime, it is unsurprising that rehabilitation has not been shown to reduce recidivism. This has led some scholars to defend rehabilitation on its own merits, not as a recidivism reduction tool (Gottschalk 2015) . But it is unlikely that rehabilitative penology will be embraced as an inherent good today, as its emphasis on offenders' personal flaws comport with contemporary punitive neoliberal politics.
Neoliberalism is a political ideology and normative order of reason in which market analytic frames become the dominant schema for evaluating all aspects of human life. The application of market rationality to non-economic phenomena has specific implications, as people are encouraged to view themselves as firms and cultivate their human capital in order to compete in all domains of life. Inequality is then naturalized because it is attributed to the failure of some to develop competitive human capital (Brown 2016, pp. 1-74) . Since the success of capital is premised on defeating competitors, failure populations must always exist as a matter of principle in a neoliberal context. The state is then not simply retrenched; progressive assistance is seen as a distortion of market dynamics and is replaced by intrusive state interventions punishing the failures produced by the marketplace (Brown 2016, p. 72; Spence 2016, pp. 21-22) .
Loïc Wacquant has shown how since its ascendance in the 1970s, neoliberalism has paternalistically regulated urban marginality and criminality by interpreting the behavior of poor and criminal populations as functions of their personal shortcomings warranting punishment and a denial of social and economic security. Punitive politics operates symbolically to convey the message to marginalized populations that they will be punished unless they transform into successful market-compliant worker-citizens (Wacquant 2009 ).
Neoliberal rationality, and its tendency to blame criminality on underdeveloped human capital, creates an amenable context for rehabilitative penology to be employed punitively. The idea that offenders alone are responsible for their behavior and that incorrigibility can only be attributed to causes within the individual complements the application human capital theory to criminality. Further, the history of American eugenics clarifies the potential dangers posed by the contemporary revival of biocriminology in a neoliberal political context. While the state has consistently blurred the distinction between mentally ill, disabled, and criminal populations-and, as Bernard
Harcourt (2006) has suggested, emphasized their containment and "reformation" in different institutional settings overtime-the eugenic links between mental illness, disability, and criminality forged early in the century have largely been rejected. 7 But eugenicists' use of rehabilitative ideology illustrates the potential for contemporary biocriminology and a revived rehabilitative ideology to be weaponized by punitive neoliberal coalitions, as bio-criminology implies that individuals' capacity to cultivate human capital is biologically limited.
It is unclear whether the renaissance of bio-criminology has been driven by neoliberalism, if the causal arrow points the other or both ways, or if their concurrent emergence was coincidental, but it is not the goal of this article to make this 7 Harcourt (2006) demonstrates consistency in America's aggregate institutionalization rate from 1938 to 2000, which included those institutionalized in mental facilities and prisons. After asylums deinstitutionalized in the 1960s, the prison population increased and kept the total rate relatively consistent. Harcourt's account is more descriptive than causal and downplays the larger female and white populations in asylums. Also see Ruth O'Brien (2001) on the history of disability, discrimination, and rehabilitation, for a critical analysis of rehabilitative logic compelling individuals to adjust to society rather than changing society to meet the needs of individuals.
determination. Rather, this analysis demonstrates that intellectuals and criminal justice officials have started to draw on bio-deterministic concepts in justifying punitive practices. This creates space for rehabilitative theory to be deployed punitively against the biologically incorrigible. This account is broadly consistent with Foucault's account of bio-politics, in which neoliberalism's rise is seen as intertwined with the extension of political control to all human social and biological processes. Bio-politics views the population as a scientific and political problem and as the central object of governance.
By measuring and regulating population-wide phenomena, such as criminal behavior, bio-politics acts preventatively to compensate for unpredictable phenomena and maintain social and biological facets of human life on equilibria (Foucault 2008, pp. 239-266; Foucault 2003, pp. 241-60) . Theoretical explanations of criminality as a biological behavioral anomaly situate "incorrigible" offenders within power discourses in which they are aberrations from this equilibrium and necessitate incarceration.
The roots of bio-criminology's revival can be traced to the 1960s and 1970s when research on XYY "Super-Males" was advanced as evidence of crime's biological basis (Gould 1981, pp. 173-5) . Scholars have recognized that deterministic intellectual constructions of criminality have since surfaced in political discourse, including "career criminal" scholarship during the Reagan years and "super-predator" research in the 1990s, which permitted policymakers to rationalize punitive policies by depicting criminality as an incurable threat to public safety (Howell 2009; Hagan 2010 Racial ideologies have also intermixed with bio-deterministic crime discourse, with scholars linking biological criminality to race (Herrnstein and Murray 1994, pp. Grasso 28 238-251; Raine 2013, p. 265) . This complements the Right's increased emphasis on cultural and biological pathologies as the primary explanations for disparate black criminality since the 1960s (Flamm 2005; Bobo 2004) . Of course, the roots of racial disparities in criminal justice are more than a carryover of Progressive Era beliefs about innate black criminality. Naomi Murakawa (2014) has demonstrated that liberal efforts to professionalize the justice system and protect blacks from racial violence in mid century laid the institutional and rhetorical groundwork for the racially biased crime politics of the latter century. But the durability of ideas of black criminality and the revival of biocriminology indicates that a renewed emphasis on rehabilitation is unlikely to provide black offenders meaningful reform opportunities, since neoliberal political and intellectual discourse already embraces the idea of black incorrigibility.
Rehabilitative ideology places accountability for crime with individuals by emphasizing incorrigibility and personal responsibility. This aligns with neoliberalism's individualistic orientation as well as the conclusions of bio-criminology that some offenders are innately criminal. The incorrigibility idea has historically absolved the state of responsibility for helping incorrigible offenders rehabilitate and instead facilitated their long-term containment. As a result, traditional rehabilitative strategies can validate the neoliberal agenda of retrenching social and economic programs while expanding coercive institutions to detain the disposable "incorrigible" populations produced by market dynamics. In a context in which bio-criminology is garnering increased attention, rehabilitative penology has the potential to direct the punitive politics of the contemporary neoliberal order against groups deemed biologically incorrigible.
Neoliberal cuts in progressive social and economic assistance create conditions producing poverty and crime, which the state defines as outcomes of individual pathologies, thus generating a self-fulfilling cycle of welfare retrenchment and carceral expansion. By establishing the social conditions that create disadvantaged populations and then blaming any resultant behavior on their own pathologies, neoliberalism produces marginalized populations that are subsequently penalized. Tough-on-crime policymakers in the 1970s reworked the theoretical premises of the rehabilitative ideal to help construct a politics that disguises how the justice system promotes this cycle. A robust revival of rehabilitative penology today will likely only exacerbate the punitive instincts that built these institutions.
Conclusion
Opinion research has long shown that public support for rehabilitation coexists with support for punitive policies (Cullen et al. 2000) . This article reveals that these seemingly mutually exclusive opinions are actually not substantiated by distinct logics.
Rather, the theoretical structure of rehabilitative ideology supports both positions.
It should not be surprising that many offenders recidivate after receiving rehabilitative treatment. Providing offenders with reduced sentences for good conduct may not alter their behavior in the long-term given that they often come from neighborhoods with limited potential for social and economic mobility. Even disregarding the scarcity of jobs in the communities that most offenders live in, a criminal record makes it harder for felons to find work and earns them a sub-average wage when they do (Western 2006) . The logic of rehabilitation not only dismisses the structural factors that cause crime; it also ignores how incarceration creates obstacles to reform that can offset the benefits of rehabilitation.
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To reiterate, inmate rehabilitation can offer individuals meaningful opportunities for self-improvement. But it should not be assumed that a reform agenda emphasizing rehabilitation faces no risk of a backlash. For a shift towards rehabilitative penology to shrink the carceral state, it must be divorced from its problematic premises and should not be politically framed as a recidivism reduction measure, but as an intrinsic good.
Attached to its current assumptions, rehabilitative ideology will continue to obscure the structural contributors to crime and carry ideological elements that can be exploited to justify punitive politics.
